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proved of more value to their designated audience, according to the 
publisher's release, of "aspiring law students ... [and] journalists 
and members of broadcast media." 
Given the brevity, limited currency, and awkward organiza-
tional format of Criminal Justice and the Supreme Court, it seems 
doubtful that it will offer much competition to the existing 
literature. 
ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM. Edited by 
Charles M. Haar1 and Jerold S. Kayden.2 Chicago: Planners 
Press. 1989. Pp. v, 386. Cloth $39.95. 
Douglas W. Kmiec3 
This celebratory volume contains the contributions of thirteen 
planners, economists and lawyers on the occasion of the sixtieth an-
niversary of the Euclid decision upholding the constitutionality of 
zoning. Since I neglected to send an anniversary card, perhaps this 
review can serve as something of a substitute. Not that I have been 
a great fan of the zoning process. From the writing in this volume, 
it would seem that few land-use specialists are--at least, whole-
heartedly. Yet the editors are probably right when they proclaim at 
the outset that "zoning is here to stay, as firmly entrenched a part of 
the landscape as the buildings it regulates." 
Now that is something of a startling proclamation, especially 
as the editors note a number of zoning's major deficiencies: its fail-
ure to deliver high-quality working and living environments, its ex-
clusion of low-income and minority families, and a standardlessness 
which invites corruption, or at least uneven application. Beyond 
this list is the now well-documented fact that zoning and other land 
use controls can add unnecessarily to the cost of construction. It is 
often inefficient. Of course, the constituencies supporting zoning 
like matters the way they are. Affluent suburbanites usually like 
low-density zoning, thank you, and some lawyers, planners and mu-
it overruled, Spinelli v. United States. A third selection on probable cause relies entirely on 
Spinelli to illustrate the law without any reference to Gates. 
Each essay is followed by a short bibliography. As the book has not been updated since 
1986, when it was published in hardcover, these bibliographies are incomplete. For example, 
"Informant's Tip," like some of the other essays, cites only the first edition of Professor 
LaFave's masterful four volume treatise, Search and Seizure, published in 1978. 
I. Brandeis Professor of Law, Harvard University. 
2. Lawyer and occasional visiting faculty member at the Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
3. Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. 
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nicipal administrators may relish the absence of standards and the 
concomitant increase in their discretionary power. 
The four major divisions of the book chronicle zoning in its 
historical setting, the physical environment, litigation, and the cal-
culations of economists. A fifth division contains Professor Haar's 
predictions about zoning's future. While the thirteen individually-
written chapters within these five parts contain many useful obser-
vations, some of the most compelling material can be found in Part 
I. In chapter 1, Cleveland lawyer Arthur Brooks opens the files of 
Newton D. Baker, the prominent lawyer who represented the land-
owner in Euclid. Baker's correspondence reveals that he largely 
conceded the existence of a "police power" to suppress nuisances 
but no more. His greatest concern was that the presumption of leg-
islative correctness coupled with a misuse of zoning for aesthetic 
purposes would lead to unlimited legislative power. He wrote: "if 
the right of private property is subject to the unrestrained caprice of 
village councils and the courts can do nothing [because of the pre-
sumption of legislative validity] then obviously we have outgrown 
the civilization established by the Constitution and have surren-
dered into a sort of communistic ownership and control .... " 
In opposition to Baker stood James Metzenbaum, another 
Cleveland lawyer, father of Ohio's current senior senator, and then 
chairman of Euclid's Planning and Zoning Commission. To him, 
zoning was not the destruction of the American way, but its en-
shrinement. Zoning protected home and neighborhood, and the as-
sociated values. In his words, "the bulwark and stamina of this 
country ha[ve] always been credited and conceded to the home 
owning tendencies of the American people . . . . Is it not doubly to 
the general welfare of all suburban municipalities to look after the 
safety and the health, the general welfare of those who have, and 
the many who want to come just because they found a haven and a 
promised land in the suburbs in their effort to escape from the con-
gested, accident producing and smoke-filled condition of the city 
and where, in the suburbs, they hope to find fresh air and sunlight 
and a yard for children." 
In hindsight, it is easy to understand why the case for zoning, 
resting on the very tangible importance of the family home, proved 
more powerful than the relatively remote and theoretical strictures 
of laissez-faire ideology. Since the battle in Euclid was fought on 
the lofty plane of zoning's general validity, zoning won its constitu-
tional imprimatur-though only after reargument. Had the Court's 
attention been directed to the actual application of zoning to the 
Ambler Realty tract, the file reveals that even Alfred Bettman, the 
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intellectual leader of the planner amici supporting Metzenbaum, 
thought the ordinance "a piece of arbitrary zoning." The greatest 
regret of Mr. Baker, and indeed of many landowners since, is that 
the Court failed to explicitly limit the police power to the preven-
tion of harm, as Baker had argued with considerable force. 
In Chapter 2, another Cleveland lawyer, William Randle, de-
scribes some of the other personalities behind early zoning efforts. 
Randle's chapter reveals the extent to which zoning was a product 
of a larger progressive movement for social reform. At first, it 
played second fiddle to Henry George's single tax. That proposal, it 
will be recalled, sought to capture from undeveloped land, but not 
improvements, the so-called "unearned increment" of value attribu-
table to community endeavors surrounding raw land. Major real 
estate players would have none of that, and instead these business 
interests aligned themselves with the branch of the reform move-
ment championing zoning. An old story is being told here, but an 
important one: public regulation can be easily misused to dampen 
economic competition. That zoning could create valuable scarcity 
for the owners of existing improvements through a publicly-con-
ferred monopoly was not lost on zoning's founding generation. 
It was not only competitive exclusion that zoning fostered, but 
racial segregation, and Randle reports that this was not an insignifi-
cant feature. He reports that racial tensions were high at the time 
of the enactment of the Euclid ordinance, and keeping out "undesir-
able neighbors" was clearly a motivation for a distinct part of the 
zoning movement. 4 
This theme of exclusion is further explored in Part II of the 
book dealing with zoning's (mis)application. The most troubling 
chapter in this section is that authored by Yale Rabin. Rabin is a 
planner, and while admitting that his evidence is less than wholly 
complete, he portrays a practice that he denominates "expulsive 
zoning"-namely, the introduction into black neighborhoods of dis-
ruptive, incompatible uses. Rabin views Euclid as essentially pro-
investment-keeping non-residential uses out of residential areas. 
Zoning "was a public mechanism for promoting and stabilizing pri-
vate development, reducing risk in property investment, and pro-
tecting the character and quality of single-family residential 
neighborhoods." If this is true, then the use of this public mecha-
nism to not only exclude, but expel, minorities was a sinister perver-
sion of zoning's principal purpose. 
Explicitly racial zoning was outlawed in 1917 by the Supreme 
4. See a/so S. TOLL, ZoNED AMERICAN (1969). 
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Court's decision in Buchanan v. Warley.s Yet Rabin reports that 
the practice continued as late as 1949. From zoning literature, Ra-
bin finds two examples of the just slightly more subtle expulsive 
technique in Baltimore and St. Louis. He relies on Professor Gar-
rett Power, who wrote that: "the south and southeast Baltimore 
tenement districts which housed first-generation immigrants, and 
the alley districts which housed poor blacks, were placed in indus-
trial districts so as to encourage their displacement by factories."6 
Rabin also finds proof of expulsion in a St. Louis Plan Commission 
Report that is deliberately aimed at reducing residential areas by 
more than one third. "The report makes no mention of race, but 
the city's history of racial zoning makes it reasonable to assume that 
the bulk of those intended for displacement by this draconian popu-
lation reduction were black." 
Rabin outlines several current examples from his planning 
practice. All deserve serious concern. That said, it should be 
pointed out that except for the Baltimore example mentioned above, 
each of the so-called expulsive techniques is amenable to an alterna-
tive explanation. For instance, some cases may be explained by the 
use of industrial and commercial districting as covert "holding 
zones" discouraging all new development, subject to discretionary 
approval. This introduces ft.exibility into an otherwise rigid Euclid 
format; it may reveal little or nothing about racial animus. "Expul-
sive zoning" may also have more to do with wealth than race. Zon-
ing has always been the province of the "haves," who possess the 
political infiuence and acumen to say "not in my backyard," and 
mean it. 
The exclusionary theme is continued through much of Part II. 
Peter Abeles, an urban planner, forthrightly states that zoning is of 
little relevance to the developed city, being primarily of use to the 
developing suburb. Here, issues of growth control readily collide 
head on with the pressure for growth. The battlegrounds are school 
and street capacities, lot and house size, and in the modem era, 
open space and agricultural preservation. Suburban growth also 
sounded the death-knell for central city shopping districts. 
Lingering in a portion of part II is planningtalk, a variant of 
bureaucratese. With only limited ability and patience to translate 
such passages, I can report that Joe Feagin tries to explain the new 
"more critical power-conft.ict paradigm substantially inft.uenced by a 
sophisticated reading of Marx .... " Translation: Feagin likes 
5. 245 u.s. 60 (1917). 
6. Power, The Unwisdom of Allowing City Growth to Work Out its Own Destiny 7-22 
(unpublished paper, 1985), quoted at p. 108. 
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Santa Monica, where zoning has raised income redistribution to an 
art form. Thus, Feagin reports that "Santa Monica exacted a whole 
new category of social goods: low- and moderate-income housing, 
day care centers, public parks, energy-saving features, and affirma-
tive action hiring." Some of these may well be desirable, but linking 
them to land use control merely takes unfair advantage of the lever-
age of regulatory power. It would be far better if these policy 
choices were implemented more openly than individual land use ap-
plications allow and pursuant to a general tax mechanism which 
requires everyone, planner and nonplanner alike, to put their money 
where their mouths are. 
Demonstrating that analytical ideas can be turned inside-out, 
Michael Kwartler portrays zoning as the taming of the "commons." 
The tragedy of the commons, or unowned land, was well described 
by Garrett Hardin, 1 who demonstrated that absent the internalizing 
economic force of private ownership, each of us has an incentive to 
over-exploit natural resources. In other words, we are apt to treat 
littering in the park as somebody else's problem. Regulation is used 
in the park as an imperfect substitute for the economic and personal 
interest one has in private property. Incredibly, Kwartler posits 
that zoning private property is regulating the commons. In fact, 
zoning is just the reverse, subjecting to collective or common judg-
ment decisions that previously were made privately. Perhaps what 
Kwartler is actually (and rightly) concerned about is that some pri-
vate decisions do impose external costs on commonly-held re-
sources: rivers, streams, air, highways and the like. But zoning is 
not the best solution for that problem. It would be far better to 
search for devices like transferrable pollution fees that would inter-
nalize environmental costs. 
The commons problem, however, is not Mr. Kwartler's princi-
pal interest. He is after better, freer, more flexible building design 
than traditional zoning accommodates, but somehow design that is 
still subject to regulation. He thus evinces the curious trait of an 
architect yearning to breath free, but not too free. As best I can 
make it out, he believes "performance zoning," the regulation of the 
effects of uses, rather than the old fashioned categorization of uses 
on the presumption of their effects, may be his way out of the de-
sert. I honestly cannot say whether his nomadic search is over, but 
I doubt that performance zoning will yield the oasis of beauty that 
Kwartler desires. But then, what is beauty? For Santayana, beauty 
was indescribable: "what it is or what it means can never be said." 
For K wartier, "beauty must relate directly to the way in which we 
7. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1245 (December 13, 1945). 
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perceive the world around us physiologically and psychologically. 
It must recognize the constitutional and psychological values em-
bodied in freedom of expression by encouraging a diversity of 
design responses while simultaneously defining the level of unac-
ceptable environmental dissonance." Huh? 
Just when I though I was going down for the third time in a 
planner's bog (that is, a wetland~efined roughly in federal law as 
an area capable of sustaining aquatic plant life, but not its owner), 
along came Part III dealing with "Zoning and the Courts." Thus, I 
immediately grasped that the earlier obfuscations were perhaps con-
sciously designed to lend comparative clarity to the ruminations of 
the Supreme Court. Not surprisingly, the first submission in this set 
by co-editor lawyer Jerold Kayden describes the Supreme Court's 
decision in Nol/an v. California Coastal Commission.s Nollan, he 
asserts, was a return to the substantive economic due process days 
of Lochner,9 the case that has come to represent illicit judicial in-
quiry into legislative motive in the name of freedom of contract. 
Euclid, says Kayden, established a highly deferential standard of 
review for land use decisions; Nol/an a rigorous one, and the latter 
is wrong. To prove his point, Mr. Kayden disparages Justice Scalia, 
Nol/an's author, for "shoddy scholarship and misguided analysis." 
By and large, Kayden makes an advocate's argument. He likes 
one set of cases (the deferential ones), better than the Court's more 
recent pronouncement. He accurately criticizes the Nollan major-
ity's statement that the "verbal formulations in the takings field" 
have generally been quite different than in the ordinary economic 
due process cases. In Nollan the Court said: "[w]e have required 
that the regulation 'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state inter-
est' sought to be achieved, not that the State 'could rationally have 
decided' that the measure adopted might achieve the State's objec-
tive.' "w If the Court has required this, the Justices largely kept it 
to themselves. This more exacting scrutiny may have been applied 
once, in Nectow v. City of Cambridge (1928), but prior to Nollan 
some, perhaps many, considered Nectow to be in the substantive due 
process dust bin. 
Kayden does his best to explain Nol/an as an aberration, argu-
ing that the Court has not relied on it since, and suggesting that its 
outcome had more to do with the imposition of a condition inviting 
physical invasion than a sea-change in land use law. Maybe, maybe 
not. It is too early to tell, and being a good lawyer, Kayden advises 
8. 483 u.s. 825 (1987). 
9. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
10. 483 U.S. at 834 n.3 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
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that if Nol/an means what it says, planners and municipal officials 
better recognize that the old boilerplate will no longer justify regu-
lation. He writes: 
"Courts will neither accept, nor invent, planning rationales or goals that could have 
been, but were not, demonstratively relied upon by the government agency. Un-
documented assertions will not substitute for hard evidence that planners and other 
public officials thought about what they were doing . . . . Judges may no longer be 
satisfied that one credible expert witness is willing to testify as to the planning valid-
ity of a regulation .... " 
Kayden implies, but does not demonstrate, that judicial activ-
ism is improper in the land-use field. Professor Robert Williams in 
a later chapter elaborates, offering the familiar refrain that such ju-
dicial behavior "usurps a function most wisely regarded as vested in 
the legislative branch of government." 
Williams persuasively argues that Euclid is in the Lochner 
mold. In this regard, the heart of the opinion is Justice Sutherland's 
citation of the Latin maxim, sic utere tuo ut a/ienum non laedas, or 
use your land so as not to cause injury to another. By invoking this 
common law nuisance principle, Sutherland implied that the 
Court-and not the legislature--would determine the scope of the 
police power. Williams demonstrates, however, that with minor ex-
ceptions, the Court did not second-guess local legislatures on zon-
ing matters, and that from Berman v. Parker 11 to Belle Terre,12 the 
Court deferentially accepted most land-use regulations. But in 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland,D where enforcement of a land use 
ordinance would have prevented extended related family from liv-
ing under one roof, the Court invalidated the regulation. Criticiz-
ing this decision, Williams labels Justice Stevens's concurring 
opinion "anachronistic." Stevens "analyz[es] the case within Eu-
clid's original Lochnerian framework: as an example of a regulation 
that could not be justified because it could not clearly be shown to 
be in furtherance of the public safety, health or welfare." Ditto, 
says Williams, for Nol/an. 
I agree that an unelected federal judge ought not displace the 
proper exercise of legislative power. Nevertheless, to be proper, leg-
islative power must be within its enumerated limits. A reasonable 
case can be made that the framers considered the police power to be 
nuisance-based, just as Sutherland decided, and if that is so, judicial 
insistence upon legislative observance of that fact is no usurpation 
II. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
12. 416 U.S. I (1974). 
13. 431 U.S.494(1977). 
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of legislative power.I4 But even putting the scope of the police 
power to one side, both Moore and Nol/an dealt with the relation-
ship between regulatory means and ends, not with the legitimacy of 
police power ends. This distinction is not brought out by either 
Kayden or Williams, yet it may be significant. Constitutional liter-
alists insist that due process means procedure, not substance. And 
Moore and Nollan are in a sense about "procedure": the Court did 
not question the legislative goal, but asked whether the regulation 
furthered it. This may explain why the Court's most articulate lit-
eralist, Justice Scalia, had little difficulty in Nollan reconciling def-
erence on ends with heightened scrutiny of the means. 
Professor Michael Alan Wolf's contribution forgoes discussion 
of the proper judicial role, for a careful review of the legal effect of 
the traditional zoning framework spawned by Euclid. He believes 
that Euclid has planted four seeds that have borne poisonous fruit: 
exclusion, anti-competitiveness, parochialism, and aestheticism. 
The last concern raises the K wartier problem again; that is, whether 
zoning can be used to justify the regulator's conception of what is 
beautiful. Despite its rotten apples, Wolf cautions against the dras-
tic step of abandoning the traditional zoning model, since he be-
lieves that enlightened planners and lawyers can avoid the bad 
outcomes of traditional zoning. 
But just as Wolf warned us, the reformers are at the door. The 
first is economist Robert Nelson in Part IV. Nelson thinks the nui-
sance justification for zoning is just rationalization, and that the 
name of the game in the suburbs has always been to maintain low-
density. In this respect, Nelson characterizes zoning in the fashion 
of Charles Reich, as a form of "new property" like a welfare check 
or other government benefit. Zoning is not premised upon scientific 
or expert advice, but is merely a type of middle-class largesse (con-
trol of other people's property for one's own self-interest). Nelson's 
concern is not so much the equity of this arrangement, but its effi-
ciency. He argues that the existing zoning structure is less than 
optimal because entitlements are not sufficiently defined, and they 
are nontransferable. In existing neighborhoods, he would transfer 
these entitlements to a newly created neighborhood association that 
could sell entitlements when developers make offers that cannot be 
refused. In the undeveloped context, Nelson also favors an auction 
system, seemingly indifferent to whether the rights are initially allo-
cated to the municipality and then bought with cash payments by 
developers, or vice versa. 
14. See Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause is Neither Weak Nor 
Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1639 (1988). 
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Nelson's proposal has much administrative merit, as do a 
number of the other reform proposals he thoughtfully explores. 
Similarly, fellow economist William Wheaton's subsequent chapter 
suggests the need to put a price on zoning decisions, in the form of 
more frequent compensation to landowners or even communities 
burdened by an unfavorable land use of a neighboring municipality. 
Prices, claims Wheaton, will help zoning achieve "Pareto Optimal-
ity" -that is, resource allocations making all better off. 
As matters now stand, Nelson's and Wheaton's ideas are uto-
pian. As an academic theorist, myself, I am certain that I have just 
called the kettle its usual color. It is not meant disparagingly, as the 
conceptual challenges outlined in Part IV are some of the best in the 
book. Thus, the reader coming to zoning's birthday table should 
not get the erroneous impression that these fellas are a couple of 
party poopers. As Nelson's own citation to Oliver Wendell Holmes 
reminds us, when the historical reason for a rule is long forgotten, 
"(s]ome ground of policy is thought of, which seems to explain it 
and to reconcile it with the present state of things." Is In all likeli-
hood, it will be the Nelsons and Wheatons who will supply the new 
justifications of land use policy, and in doing so, help zoning to 
modify itself to fit its new justification. 
Summing matters up, Professor Charles Haar finds reason to 
rejoice as well as to regret on zoning's anniversary. To Haar, zon-
ing's greatest weakness has been its tendency to exclude, to protect 
the "haves" from the "have nots." He also acknowledges that "the 
Euclid case and its progeny represent[s] an extraordinary expansion 
of government power into what previously had been considered a 
relatively autonomous area of private decision making." He specu-
lates that this encroachment upon private property was possible 
only because of the nuisance law analogy. Yet, as Haar aptly 
reveals, the linkage to nuisance law is also a "brake" on the use of 
zoning as an affirmative tool for "the promotion of efficient commu-
nity service patterns, of reciprocity of benefit and burden, and of 
equal treatment of other owners similarly situated." 
Haar believes that our society has outgrown nuisance-based 
land use control. In his words, "(t]o put the proposition bluntly, 
modem conditions have undermined the assumptions underlying 
Euclidean zoning." The use of the automobile and the development 
of rural tracts, new "shopping center" forms of retail sale, service-
based light industries, mixed uses, large-scale rather than lot-by-lot 
development, new forms of financing, and more, are all cited to jus-
tify the need for a "new planning age" and to "make city planning 
15. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881). 
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less rigid and abstract." Haar believes this "will call for review by 
administrative agencies specializing in land transactions and private 
property, by state and regional boards supervising local zoning ef-
forts with an eye toward reinjecting considerations of the more gen-
eral welfare, or by agencies directed toward reducing the cacophony 
of present procedures." 
Professor Haar's plea for more rigorous review of zoning deci-
sions is surely sound, and, if understood, will shatter the myth that 
zoning is a legislative, rather than an adjudicative, action. That sin-
gle readjustment would itself bring a level of accountability and reg-
ularity to land use decisions that has long been absent. Beyond this, 
Haar's is obviously a clarion call for new, creative forms of regula-
tion, a demonstration of faith in the power and appropriateness of 
government to design our physical environments, and in so doing, 
to structure our lives. On this score, Professor Haar and I worship 
in different churches. Yet one thing is certain, the intellectual con-
tributions made by this single volume are significant, even if-at 
zoning's party-a good time was not had by all. 
PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EXTENDED POLffiES OF 
THE BRmSH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES 
1607-1788. By Jack P. Greene.t Athens, Ga.: The University 
Press of Georgia. 1986. Pp. x, 274. Cloth, $30.00. 
James Hutson 2 
Despite the trendy title and subtitle, this is an old-fashioned 
volume, addressing the old-fashioned question of the constitutional 
dispute between Great Britain and her American colonies, which, 
not yielding to peaceful settlement, resulted in the appeal to arms in 
1776. Professor Jack Greene's approach, as he himself is the first to 
admit, has much in common with the old, "imperial" school of 
American history, dating back to the beginning of this century and 
represented by the writings of such venerable scholars as Charles 
Andrews and Charles Mcilwain. These writers contended that 
American historians and legal scholars were too parochial in their 
perspective, focusing as they did on the relationships between Great 
Britain and the thirteen colonies that formed the United States in 
I. Andrew Mellon Professor in the Humanities, Johns Hopkins University. 
2. Chief, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 
